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We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether 
political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 
200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more 
than 200,000 voters a runoff election takes place among the top two candidates if neither 
achieves a majority of the votes. We show that the possibility of runoff increases political 
competition. We use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality 
from political competition to fiscal policy. Our results suggest that political competition 
induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. 
The impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, 
suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office. 
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“How an excess of political stability can get in the way of good government” 
The Economist, May 17
th, 2008 commenting on the mishaps of the 
Concertación, the Chilean long-standing governing coalition. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is well established that electoral rules have strong implications for the political 
process. For example, plurality voting favors a two-party system (“Duverger’s Law”, 
Duverger, 1954). By affecting party formation, different electoral rules induce different 
levels of electoral competition. However, the effects of political competition on policy 
choices are not well understood empirically. It is not surprising that the empirical link from 
political competition to policy making can be elusive, as the two are simultaneously 
determined. While barriers to entry can lead to low competition and bad policies, low 
competition can also coexist with good policies, if for example a highly capable incumbent 
discourages entry by challengers. Although a growing body of evidence supports the view 
that competition improves policy making,
1 too little a barrier to entry may lead to instability, 
fragmentation and worse policies.
2 We explore a unique discontinuity in the rules for 
municipal elections in Brazil, which provides a sharp identification of how competition 
improves fiscal policy. Our results indicate that competition improves fiscal policy. 
Mayoral elections in Brazil take place every four years, with the election rules 
varying depending on the size of the electorate. In municipalities with more than 200,000 
voters elections are in a two-round system. A runoff between the first-round winner and the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Besley et al (2005), Besley and Case (1995), Rodgers and Rodgers (2000), and Besley and 
Case (2003) and Gordon and Huber (2007). 
2 See, for example, Campante et al (2008).    3  
 
runner-up takes place if the former receives less than 50 percent of valid votes. In 
municipalities with less than 200,000 voters there is only one round with the winner being 
the one who gains the most votes. Voting is mandatory in all races. The 200,000 threshold 
rule provides an exogenous and abrupt change in the voting system as a function of the 
electorate size. As long as the electoral rules cause “political market” structure, it can be a 
source of exogenous variation in the degree of competitiveness of the “political market”. This 
discontinuity arguably provides the sharpest identification for the causal effect of political 
competition on fiscal policy outcomes. 
The link from electoral rules to political market structure is well established in the 
literature.
3 Most comparisons contrast majority and proportional systems, and why the latter 
favors multi-party structures. Similar arguments can be made for comparing one-round with 
two-round majority elections. For example, consider a one-round election and suppose that 
60 percent of the electorate is left-leaning. If there is one left-leaning and one right-leaning 
party contesting the election, the former easily win. But if there are two competing left-
leaning parties, the right-leaning one may be able to achieve a plurality of the vote. In this 
case, the third candidate would be a “spoiler,” and in a well functioning system the two left-
leaning parties should form a coalition and launch a single candidate. In a two-round 
election, the presence of the third candidate should not affect the final outcome and therefore 
we should expect a larger supply of candidates under that system.
4,5 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Duverger’s Law, which is formally proved in Palfrey (1989). 
4 Note that the presence of a runoff would not necessarily rule out a right-leaning party victory in this example. 
Suppose there are four left-leaning parties each of which receives 15 percent of the vote, and two right-leaning 
parties that receive 20 percent of the vote. Then, a runoff would take place with the two right-leaning parties. 
5 The presence of a runoff is more likely to affect the outcome of the election when voters choose their first 
choice of candidate (sincere voting) than under strategic voting. The political economy literature has interest in 
(continued)    4  
 
Methodologically, we use a regression-discontinuity design (RDD)
6, which is known 
for its very high internal validity as it exploits the exogenous variation that occurs around the 
discontinuity point. Thus, it dispenses with concerns about unobserved heterogeneity driving 
results. Our empirical results show a discrete and sizeable jump in voting concentration as 
function of the electorate size and that this jump occurs at the 200,000 voter threshold. That 
is, there is an abrupt increase in political competition for municipalities where the second 
round is present. Following the Political Science literature, we measure concentration both as 
the number of effective candidates as well as the share of votes going to the third-placed or 
lower candidates.
7 Thus, the runoff reduces the “political market concentration” by 
encouraging more parties to enter and/or inducing sincere voting in the first round, thus 
turning the political regime more competitive.
 8  
Under the assumption that the presence of the second round does not affect policy 
choices directly, it provides exogenous variation to estimate the causal impact of political 
competition on policy choices. Although one can always conceive reasons for why the 
presence of the second round per se will affect policy choices, they are rather far-fetched.
9 
                                                                                                                                                       
sincere versus strategic voting because of their different implications for modeling. Some empirical evidence is 
available, mainly using structural modeling strategies. See Degan and Merlo (2007) and Merlo (2006).  
6 RDD was introduced by Thistlewaite and Campbell (1960) but has been widely diffused in the empirical 
economics literature since the work of Van der Klaauw (2002), Angrist and Lavy (1999), Hahn, Todd and Van 
der Klaauw (2001), among others. See also the recent work of Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for an extensive 
survey on RDD. 
7 Starting with Laakso and Taagera (1979), the Political Science literature has used the number of effective 
parties as their main measure of political competition. The number of effective candidates is the inverse of the 
sum of squared vote shares, i.e., the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of vote shares multiplied by 
10,000.  
8While revising this paper we came across Fujiwara (2009), which is an independent paper exploring the same 
discontinuity in electoral rules. His paper only uses the discontinuity to test sincere voting, unlike our paper 
which uses the RD design as source of exogenous variation in political competition, which is then used to test 
the effect of differential political competition on policy outcomes. 
9 One possible scenario is the following: When a second round is necessary, new coalitions are formed with 
first-round losers and thus additional compromises on policies have to be made. This critique does not threaten 
our identification strategy because the future cannot cause the past: we use political competition at the end to 
(continued)    5  
 
Our results indicate that a higher degree of political competition causes more capital 
expenditures, less expenditures in current expenditures, and more construction of schools. 
Most of the estimated reduction in current expenditure takes place through lower payroll 
expenditures. To the extent that Brazilian politicians tend to heavily favor current 
expenditures and underprovide public investment, this shift is interpreted as welfare 
enhancing (especially given an under-developed infra-structure). Thus, political competition 
seems to have beneficial effects.
10 In contrast with previous works, we do not estimate the 
effect of political competition on the size of government because in most municipalities the 
vast majority of expenditures are financed by federal and state transfers, which accounted for 
almost all of the revenues in our main sample of municipalities with 100,000-300,000 voters. 
Federal transfers are determined by a formula, as a function of the municipality’s population 
and the per capita income in its state. There are no discontinuities with respect to population 
in our main sample.
11 
Interestingly, we find much stronger results when we only consider races in which the 
incumbent could run for reelection. Incumbents do have a stake in their parties staying in 
power but they respond much more to competition when they themselves can be reelected. 
This fact is in line with the empirical literature. Using US state-level data, Besley and Case 
(1995) compare the behavior of governors who face a biding term limit with those who can 
run for reelections, and find that a biding term limit affects policy choices. Using Brazilian 
                                                                                                                                                       
the mandate to proxy for expected political competition. Nevertheless, we compared fiscal policy in cities in 
which the election went to the second by a small margin to cities whose election was decided in the first round 
by a small margin, in the spirit of Lee et al (2004). We found no significant difference. 
10 It is consensual among Brazilian economists (within the mainstream of the profession) that current 
expenditures is excessive while public investment is at a sub-optimal level. See, for example, Werneck (2008). 
11 The last sharp discontinuity in the formula takes place at 156,216 habitants, which involves municipalities 
that are typically smaller than those with 100,000-300,000 voters.    6  
 
municipal data, Ferraz and Finan (2008) document that mayors who cannot run for reelection 
are more corrupt than first-term mayors, who can run for reelection. 
Our results are also consistent with previous studies documenting the beneficial 
effects of political competition at the sub-national level.
12 For example, Besley et al (2005) 
use the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to associate an increase in political competition in 
American Southern states with an improved economic performance measured by income per 
capita. They show that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 increased political competition. 
However, the link from political competition to income per capita remains somewhat 
suggestive, as it is difficult to isolate other factors that may have caused income to increase 
in the South over a long horizon. In contrast, our paper focuses on policy choices instead of 
economic outcomes such as income per capita. By focusing on actual policy choices, whose 
change can be measured in the short-run, we provide a cleaner identification of the effect of 
political competition to welfare.  
Our paper relates to the findings of cross-country comparisons of electoral rules on 
fiscal policy outcomes. Persson and Tabellini (2004) show that presidential regimes and 
majoritarian rules lead to smaller governments than parliamentary regimes and proportional 
representation. Majoritarian rules also tilt the composition towards less transfer expenditures 
than proportional representation. This last result was also presented and formalized in Milesi-
Ferretti et al (2002). It is difficult to draw comparisons with our setting, since much of these 
results focused on the distinction between majoritarian and proportional representation, 
whereas our analysis is limited to the presence of a runoff. But taking the results at face-
                                                 
12 It is possible that, by reducing the probability of remaining in office, higher political competition worsens   
policies by shortening the incumbent’s horizon. Campante et al (2008) show that stability can have non-
monotonic effects on the quality of policies, which is empirically supported in their cross-country analysis.     7  
 
value would suggest that increasing political competition through a runoff election can lower 
current expenditures, whereas increasing political competition through proportional 
representation (where entry barriers for parties are lower) has the opposite effect.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the institutional 
background and the data used. Section 3 shows descriptive statistics of our sample and some 
graphical evidence that the 200,000 rule is exogenous, in the sense that a “no-manipulation” 
condition is satisfied. In section 4, we discuss in detail how the discontinuity in the voting 
system allows identification of the causal effect of political competition on fiscal 
expenditures. In section 5 we present and discuss our main findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Data Description 
Runoff elections were introduced by the 1988 Constitution. Article 29, chapter 4 
legislates on municipal elections. Little hard evidence is available on the motivation behind 
instituting two-round elections. Anecdotes suggest a desire to ensure “legitimate” outcomes 
by avoiding the risk that a candidate wins a one-round elections with a small share of the 
votes (the Constitution was written at a time when Brazil was transitioning from twenty years 
of military rule towards becoming a consolidated democracy). The presidential and all 
gubernatorial elections have two-rounds. Cost considerations drove the 200,000 threshold for 
municipal elections. Voter registration is compulsory and voting is mandatory. Thus, the    8  
 
intensity of political competition will not affect whether or not a municipality is above or 
below the threshold, which would not be the case if voter registration was voluntary.
13  
The first round election takes place sometime in the beginning of October, and the 
second round sometime between the end of October and early November.
14 Where the 
election has only one round, it takes place the same day as the first round. The state-level 
electoral authority is in charge of counting the number of registered voters per city to define 
where second round may take place. The electoral authority rests with the Electoral Justice 
System, which is composed of a federal entity, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), and 27 
state entities, the Tribunais Eleitorais Regionais (TREs). Although formally a member of the 
judicial system, the TSE not only judges but also performs executive and legislative tasks. It 
enacts specific legislation for elections and is co-responsible for the actual execution of the 
elections (presidential, gubernatorial and mayoral elections). The TREs are responsible for 
the execution of gubernatorial and mayoral elections. Among the executive tasks are 
registering voters, resolving litigation among candidates, enforcing electoral legislation, and 
running the actual voting process. The fact that voters’ headcount is done by the state-level 
TREs dramatically reduces the scope for municipalities to manipulate their electorate size. 
Moreover, since voting and voter registration are compulsory in Brazil one would have to 
orchestrate large scale document fraud to manipulate the municipal-level electorate size, 
something rather far-fetched. 
                                                 
13 The electorate is composed of three groups. All citizens between 18 and 64 years are automatically registered, 
and voting is mandatory for registered voters. Second, between 16 and 18 registration in optional, but voting is 
mandatory once registered. Finally, voting is optional for registered voters older than 64 years. Besides fines, 
sanctions for not voting include becoming ineligible for public sector jobs, passport issuance and, more 
importantly, government transfers. 
14 In 1996, the first round took place on October 3
rd, and the second on November 15
th. In 2000, it took place on 
October 1
st and October 29
th. In 2004, on October 3
rd and October 31
st.    9  
 
The Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) publishes the electoral data. Election results, 
as well the number of registered voters, are electronically available for a total of 16,498 first-
round races over three election cycles: 1996, 2000 and 2004.
15 The first two-round municipal 
election took place in 1992 (the first after the 1988 Constitution). Unfortunately, electronic 
data are not available for 1992.
16 The analysis focuses on a subset of these races: those that 
took place in cities with electorate size between 100,000 and 300,000. Although we have 
information on a large number of races, identification is only credible around the 
discontinuity threshold 200,000 voters. In 2004, 83 cities were in this range. While this is a 
small share of the total number of Brazilian municipalities, the combined population covered 
in our sample is fairly large, with about 28 million inhabitants in 2004 (15.5 percent of the 
Brazilian population).  
We consider four fiscal policy variables: capital, current and payroll expenditures as 
proportions of total expenditures aggregated over the administration cycle, and the number of 
municipal public schools built net of schools closed throughout the administration cycle.
17 
Fiscal data come from the Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, the National Treasury, which is 
subordinated to the Ministério da Fazenda (the Ministry of Finance). The number of schools 
at the municipal level is from the Censo Escolar, a universal census of schools conducted 
annually by the Ministry of Education. 
                                                 
15 The total number of municipalities in Brazil is a little over 5,000. This figure oscillates slightly because of 
new municipalities, which are normally created by dismembering from another municipality. No municipality 
around the discontinuity (between 100,000 and 300,000) was dismembered during our sample period, so our 
results are not affected. 
16 Data is available after the electronic ballot was introduced by Law # 9.100, from 1995 onwards. The 1996 
municipal elections were the first to have electronic ballot in the vast majority of races. 
17 There was a significant expansion of education in Brazil during the sample covered in our study. Primary 
school net enrollment has been about 95 percent over the last decade. But secondary school net enrollment 
increased from about 65 percent in the late 1990s to about 80 percent in the most recent years.     10  
 
Although the size of the government would also be of interest, the vast majority of 
expenditures in small Brazilian municipalities are financed by transfers from the federal and 
state governments. This makes the size of municipal governments almost exogenous to the 
municipal-level political process.
18  
Finally, Brazilian electoral institutions are such that it is quite difficult to find 
plausible channels for the electoral rule to have a direct effect on fiscal policies, which makes 
the rule a source of exogenous variation to estimate the impact of political competition on 
policy making.
19 
The exogeneity of the runoff is confirmed by the actual distribution of electoral size. 
Figure 1 shows the histogram and kernel density estimate of the electorate size. A significant 
discontinuity at 200,000 would raise the suspicion that municipalities were manipulating the 
electorate size. As expected, the histogram shows that the frequency drops almost 
monotonically with electorate size. The histogram shows a slight drop from bin [186,000 ; 
200,000] to bin [200,000 ; 214,000], but it is not particularly pronounced compared with 
other fluctuations in the figure. Still, given the drop in the histogram, we further investigate 
                                                 
18 In our main sample (municipalities between 125,000 and 275,000 voters), overall transfers represent on 
average roughly 69 percent of revenue. Taxes and fees amounted to another 18 percent, and capital revenues 
were the remaining 13 percent. Transfers are constitutionally mandated shares on state and federal-level taxes, 
and are therefore exogenously determined. The two sources of municipal-level sources of income are an urban 
property tax (IPTU, roughly 4.7 percent of total income) and a tax on services (ISS, with 5.8 percent of total 
income). The former is highly dependent on property values, and the later on economic activity. Although small 
changes in tax rates are possible, total income on IPTU and ISS are largely not under the control of incumbents. 
Finally, except for very large municipalities, Brazilian municipalities do not have access to debt markets, arms’ 
length or banking. Thus, the only of capital revenues is the sale of physical assets, which has clear limits.  
19 We could conjecture only two possible objections to this assumption, none of which seems relevant. One is 
that, in anticipation to the possibility of a second round, incumbents would invest more to inaugurate public 
works between rounds. The runoff takes place approximately three weeks after the first round, so this channel 
seems quite farfetched, particularly since electoral law forbids inauguration for a period before elections. One 
could also argue that incentives for accepting lobbying money from contractors are higher in two-round 
elections because one has to finance a longer campaign. However, since rounds are so close in time, the 
additional campaigning comes at relatively low cost above and beyond that of first-round campaigning. TV 
advertising is allocated in a centralized manner and is free of charge. Thus, little room is left to spend campaign 
money between rounds.    11  
 
the possibility of manipulation by estimating the density below and above the discontinuity 
point 200,000, a procedure inspired in McCrary (2008).
20 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 2A shows a small discontinuity at 200,000, already suggested by the histogram 
in Figure 1. This tiny discontinuity is neither practically nor statistically significant.
21 In 
Figure 2B, we repeat the procedure at 150,000. The discontinuity is larger now, despite the 
absence of any reason for the electorate distribution to have any discrete change at 150,000. 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for all municipalities, as well as for the 
subsample with 100,000-300,000 voters that we focus on. Table 1.A contains demographic 
information. The vast majority of municipalities in Brazil are small: half of the 16,498 races 
occurred in municipalities whose electorate was smaller than 7,066 voters. Municipalities 
with electorate size between 100,000 voters and 300,000 are quite different from the average 
municipality. Races in our sample took place in richer and better educated cities. 
Interestingly, income inequality within larger cities is not different from the rest of the 
country. Figure 3 shows an important feature of the data: no relevant discontinuity in income, 
inequality and education appears at 200,000. Our identification strategy demands the absence 
of discontinuities in variables that may affect the outcome variables. 
                                                 
20 The procedure consists of two parts. The first stage estimates the histogram in Figure 1. The second stage 
consists in estimating two local linear regressions, above and below the discontinuity point. The percentage of 
observations in each bin is treated at the dependent variable, and the midpoint of the bins as regressors. See 
McCrary (2008) for further details. 
21 We compute the t-statistic based on the test proposed in McCrary (2008).     12  
 
  
[insert Table 1 here] 
[insert Figure 3 here] 
Table 1.B shows the summary statistics for the political competition variables. The 
size of electorate and the number of candidates are positively related, which is expected as 
the size of the political market induces entry. Mayoral races in Brazil have on average 2.78 
candidates. In contrast, the 100,000-300,000 voters sample have on average 4.72 candidates. 
Following the political economy literature,
22 we use two different measures of political 
competition: the number of effective candidates, which is the inverse of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), and the percentage of votes for all candidates except the first and 
second placed in the first round. The HHI is the sum of squared vote shares. Electoral 
competition is tougher in our sample than in whole universe of municipalities.  
Table 1.C shows some statistics for four fiscal variables: investment as proportion of 
total expenditures, current expenditures as proportion of total expenditures, payroll as 
proportion of total expenditures, and the percent increase in the number of municipal public 
schools.
23 In the sample covering all municipalities most expenditures (78 percent) go to 
current expenditures, while 14 percent go to investments. On average, the number of 
municipal schools grew a little. Municipalities in our 100,000-300,000 electorate size sample 
are slightly different in terms of fiscal variables. They spend a more on investment and a less 
                                                 
22 Starting with Laakso and Taagera (1979), the literature has used the number of effective parties as their main 
measure of political competition in the Political Science literature. 
23 The number of observations is lower for the change in municipal schools because data is not available for 
1996.    13  
 
on current, particularly on payroll expenditures, and build more schools. However, 
differences are not very pronounced. 
 
4. Estimating Causal Effects 
We are interested in the parameter β1 given by the following equation: 
          it t F it F i it ELECT t POLCOMP E FISCAL              , 1 0 |                             (1) 
where FISCALit is a fiscal policy outcome in municipality i at an year t prior to the election 
year   (t < ) and POLCOMPi  is the level of political competition in the next election that 
is expected by the incumbent when making policy decisions over the administration cycle. 
We measure political competition by concentration of vote shares. The variable ELECT is the 
size of electorate (number of registered voters). As fiscal policy and political competition 
may change systematically with the city size, inclusion of    F   - a smooth function of 
electorate – controls this potential source of bias. For the same reason we include  t F,  , to 
control for year fixed effects. Finally,  it   is a function of unobserved shocks to fiscal policy. 
The parameter β1 is the causal effect of the expected competition at election year  
on policy outcome variables. As mentioned previously, the intensity of political competition 
is likely to be affected by the quality of policies (reverse causation), so 
 0 ,    i it POLCOMP Cov , and an OLS estimation strategy would fail to recover the causal 
impact of POLCOMP on policy outcomes. Moreover, political competition is measured with 
error by construction. Ideally, that variable should be defined as the incumbent’s expectation 
of how competitive the political environment will be in next election. Unfortunately, that    14  
 
expectation is not observable.
24 The alternative often used in the literature on political cycles 
(which we emulate) is to use actual, realized political competition. In other words: 
        it i i t COM POL E POLCOMP        |                                                                        (2) 
where  it   is uncorrelated with    t COM POL E i    | . In this case, we expect that 
measurement error causes attenuation bias, which would work against finding an impact of 
political competition on policy choices when OLS is used.  
Therefore, we estimate β1 in (1) indirectly by the ratio of two reduced form equations. 
The first reduced form equation relates the actual  POLCOMP to DUM200, a flexible 
polynomial of electorate size, time controls and an unobserved error term: 




r r P r
P P
r t ELECT DUM POLCOMP           200 1 0                                       (3) 
where  r is electoral race, i.e., a municipality in an election year and    P   is a flexible 
polynomial of electorate that may have different functional forms above and below the 
threshold point. Finally,   t
P
r   controls for year t fixed effects. 
We rewrite the outcome equation (1) using actual instead of the expected of political 
competition. The parameter of interest is β1.  
          r
F
r r F r r t ELECT POLCOMP FISCAL           1 0 ,                                         (4) 
where   t
F
r   corresponds to  t F,   and  r   is an unobserved error term. 
The reduced-form equation for FISCAL is obtained by replacing POLCOMP in (4) 
with its specification from (3). The reduced-form equation is: 
                                                 
24 It is conceivable to use opinion polls during the administration cycle. However, these polls are not conducted 
at a sufficient number of mid-sized municipalities to implement any quantitative empirical procedure.    15  
 




r r F r
F F
r t ELECT DUM FISCAL           200 1 0                                           (5) 
Straightforward algebra yields 
P F
1 1 1     , which is an implied instrumental variables 
estimate of the causal effect of political competition on fiscal variables. 
We follow a local identification strategy as it is more plausible to assume that any 
unobserved factor will be randomly assigned to municipalities immediately below and above 
the 200,000 point. In other words, besides the runoff system, no systematic differences in 
political competition arise when we compare municipalities on both sides of the threshold. 
For this reason our empirical analysis is restricted to municipalities in the vicinity of the 
discontinuity in the electoral rule. 
In order to obtain a consistent estimator of the causal effect in a regression-
discontinuity design, we estimate the models (3) and (5) by modeling    P   and    F   as a 
low-order polynomial, and restrict the data to races with electorate size within a 100,000 
window around the 200,000 discontinuity point.
25 We discuss the details of the 
implementation in the next section. 
 
5. Results 
Figure 4 shows how political competition varies with the electorate. We initially 
regress the political competiton variables on year dummies. We then use the residuals to 
estimate a linear regression for each side of the discontinuity at 200,000 registered voters. 
                                                 
25 Results are robust to selecting different subsamples. In fact, whe we use narrower sample – e.g., 150,000 
through 250,000 – we get stronger results. In addition to estimating the models parametrically as described 
above, we also estimate them nonparametrically using local linear regression as in Hahn, Todd, and van der 
Klaauw (2001) as a robustness check. Our nonparametric estimates reveal that the results are robust to 
specification.    16  
 
For illustration purposes, each dot in the scatter plot averages represents the local average at 
each 10,000 range of registered voters. The first four charts show the discontinuities in the 
share of votes going to the third-placed candidate or lower and in the number of effective 
candidates. We consider two samples: all races in the 100,000-300,000 electorate size range, 
and a subsample that includes only races where the mayor could run for reelection.  
Before 1997 incumbent mayors, governors and presidents could not run for 
reelection. In January 1997, Congress amended the Constitution to allow reelection, with at 
most two consecutive terms. Hence, while incumbent mayors could not run for reelection in 
1996, all incumbents could in 2000. In our sample for 2000, 77 percent of the incumbents 
actually ran for reelection. In 2004, only 52 percent of the incumbents were in their first 
terms, and could run. Out of those, 91 percent ran for reelection. Our results consider these 
two samples: all races and races in which the mayor could run for reelection. 
As can be seen in Figure 4 a sharp increase in competition arises at the discontinuity 
threshold. Interestingly, the increase is stronger in the subsample of races where the mayor 
could run for reelection. The last 4 charts show that the discontinuity result remains robust 
when the sample is narrowed to a tighter vicinity of the threshold (150,000-250,000 
electorate). As expected, no discontinuity arises when we estimate a “placebo” with a 
discontinuity at 150,000. 
Table 2 reports results from regressions of political competition on the size of the 
electorate. All regressions include a dummy for 200,000 or more registered voters, and a 
polynomial of electorate size. In Panel A competition is measured by the vote share of 
candidates placed third or lower, while in Panel B it is measured by the number of effective 
candidates. Column (1) considers all races in the 100,000-300,000 electorate range, while    17  
 
column (2) restricts the sample to those where the mayor could run for reelection. Columns 
(3) and (4) are analogous to (1) and (2) but instead of including a quadratic polynomial of 
electorate size, we allow two different linear functions of electorate size above and below the 
200,000 threshold. Consistently with Figure 4, the effect of the discontinuity on political 
competition is stronger in the subsample of reelections races. All point estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and point to an increase in the vote share of the 
third-placed candidates or lower of roughly 60 percent in the whole sample and around 110 
percent in the reelection eligible sample. The number of effective candidates increases by 13 
percent for the whole sample and 22 percent for the reelection eligible sample. These results 
are stronger when the sample is restricted to a narrower range of the electorate (e.g. 125,000 
to 275,000), and are available upon request. 
Turning to the fiscal outcome variables, our identifying assumption is that the 
discontinuity at 200,000 voters only impacts fiscal policy through its effect on political 
competition.
26 We consider three fiscal dependent variables: the logarithms of the share in 
total expenditures of investment, of current expenditures, and of payroll expenditures. Since 
yearly data is rather noisy, the dependent variables are the total share over the four-year 
administration cycle. Additionally, we also measure the impact of political competition on 
investment in education, measured as the change in the number of schools. For the fiscal 
variables, three cycles are considered: 1993-1996, 1997-2000 and 2001-2004. Unfortunately, 
data on the number of schools are only available for the 1997-2000 and 2001-2004 cycles.  
                                                 
26 The municipalities do not bear the costs of the election, so there is no reason why crossing the 200,000 voter 
threshold should impact fiscal policy other than through political competition.    18  
 
Figure 5 shows the reduced-form estimates for the fiscal variables. The first two 
charts show an increase in investment as a proportion of total expenditures, and in the 
number of schools in the municipality, as a result of crossing the 200,000 electorate 
threshold.
 27  The increase is much stronger for the races where the mayor could run for 
reelection. The last four charts show a decline in the share of current expenditures and in the 
share of payroll expenditures after crossing the 200,000 electorate threshold. The change is 
very small when all races are considered, but becomes pronounced when the sample is 
restricted to municipalities where the mayor could run for reelection.  
Table 3 reports the reduced-form estimates for the fiscal outcome variables. The 
regressions are analogous to those in Table 2 (except for the dependent variable), and we 
again present results for a sample that includes all races in the 100,000-300,000 electorate 
range, as well as for a subsample including only the races where the mayor could run for 
reelection. The model in columns (1) and (2) include a quadratic polynomial of electorate 
size. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for all races and for the reelection subsample 
respectively. In both samples, crossing the 200,000 voter threshold is associated with higher 
investment; more schools being constructed; lower payroll and lower current expenditures. 
There is a 28 percent increase in investment associated with the threshold for all races and a 
59 percent increase for the reelection sample. The number of schools increases by 13 percent 
for all races, and 19 percent for the reelection sample. The share of current expenditures 
declines by 3 and 5 percent for all races and reelection races, respectively. Payroll 
expenditures decline by 2 percent for all races and 13 percent for the reelection sample, and 
                                                 
27 It would also be interesting to check how payroll expenditures on teachers behaves as a function of political 
competition. Unfortunately only total payroll expenditures is only available.     19  
 
only the latter is statistically significant. It is important to notice that the negative effect of 
political competition on payroll is stronger than the one on current expenditures as a whole. 
Payroll expenditures are 50 percent of total outlays. Total current expenditures include 
payroll expenditures and represent 70 percent of total outlays (see Table 1). Thus, the decline 
in payroll expenditures accounts for all the reduction in total current expenditures. When a 
linear polynomial on electorate size is interacted with DUM200 (columns 3 and 4), estimates 
are stronger that in columns (1) and (2) both in economic and statistical significance. Results 
are similar (and often stronger) when we focus on a narrower electorate range around the 
threshold (e.g. 125,000-275,000). 
Table 4 presents the causal estimates of political competition on the outcome 
variables. Results for the whole are not all statistically significant in the reduced form for all 
four categories. For conciseness, we report only results for the reelection-race sub-sample 
because these are the only ones that produce systematically significant point estimates.
28 The 
estimated elasticity of the share of investment in total expenditures with respect to the vote 
share going to the 3
rd placed candidates or lower range is around 0.60 percent, while the 
elasticity with respect to the effective number of candidates is around 3.5 percent. This 
difference in magnitude mainly reflects the smaller variance in the number of effective 
candidates (see Table 1), with the results broadly comparable when measured in terms of one 
standard deviation changes in the political competition variables (see paragraph below). The 
semi-elasticity for the percent change in the number of schools with respect to the percentage 
of votes to the third and lower candidates is around 19 percent, and the semi-elasticity with 
                                                 
28 We avoid using the sample with all races for estimation of the causal effect since the first stage statistics are 
not all statistically significant, which could cause the problem of weak instruments..    20  
 
respect to the number of effective candidates is 106 percent. The elasticity with respect to the 
vote share of the third placed candidates or lower is roughly 13 percent for the expenditure 
share of payroll, and around 5 percent for the expenditure share of current expenditures. In 
both cases the elasticities with respect to the effective number of candidates are again much 
larger (see columns (3) and (4)). 
We gauge the economic significance of these results by focusing on a one standard 
deviation increase from the mean in the political competition variables. Within the sub-
sample of reelection races, the vote share of candidates placed third or lower has a mean of 
17.44 and standard deviation of 12.53. Averaging the effects estimated in columns (1) and 
(2) a one standard deviation increase from the mean in the vote share of candidates placed 
third or lower implies a: 35 percent increase in the share of investment in total expenditures; 
10 percent increase in the number of schools; and 3 and 7 percent decline in the share of total 
current expenditures and payroll expenditures, respectively. A one standard deviation 
increase in the number of effective candidates implies: 55 percent increase in the share of 
investment in total expenditures; 16 percent increase in the number of schools; and a 5 and a 
10 percent decline in the share of total current expenditures and payroll expenditures, 
respectively. In the sub-sample of reelection races, investment, total current expenditures and 
payroll expenditures are 13, 50 and 73 percent of total outlays, respectively. Thus, the 
reduction in payroll expenditures responds for the decline in total current expenditures, and 
compensates for the increase in investment outlays, leaving the size of government roughly 
constant.
29  
                                                 
29 A one-standard deviation change is far for a local impact. Thus we compute the figures as exact percentage 
effects, not extrapolations of elasticities that are valid only locally. For the elasticities of investment, current 
(continued)    21  
 
In summary, results suggest that the presence of the second round increases political 
competition, which in turn cause a reduction in payroll expenditures and an increase in 
investment expenditures. In particular, more resources are allocated in building schools. 
Interestingly, the causal impact of political competition is stronger when mayors are eligible 
for reelection, i.e., when they have a higher stake in staying in office. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper exploited a discontinuity in Brazilian electoral rules to show that runoff 
elections are associated with more candidates and sharper political competition than 
majoritarian elections. This result is in line with a large body of theoretical and empirical 
evidence on electoral rules and electoral competition. An important contribution of our paper 
is to exploit a quasi-natural experiment that exogenously changes the electoral rule. Thus, 
among the existing papers on this subject, our design arguably provides the cleanest 
identification setup for capturing the effect of electoral rules on electoral competition. 
Our most interesting result, however, is related to the effect of lower entry costs for 
political competition on fiscal outcomes. In theory that effect can be ambiguous and lower 
entry costs may improve or worsen fiscal policy. Also, incumbent politicians can make 
policy choices that directly affect political competition, which could create a reverse 
causality problem.  
                                                                                                                                                       
expenditures and payroll expenditures, we use :%∆    100    exp  
          
      
   
  1  . For the semi-elasticity 
of the percentage change in schools we use: ∆        log 
          
      .    22  
 
However, by taking advantage of the discontinuity in the electoral rule as a function 
of the electorate size, we can unequivocally identify the causal effect of political competition 
on fiscal outcomes. Our results suggest that lower political entry costs shift public 
expenditures from current expenditures towards investment, which can be perceived as 
welfare improving. 
Despite the sharp identification provided by the discontinuity we explore, there are 
valid concerns relating to external validity. It is likely that the net effect depends on the 
particular features of the setting. For example, higher competition likely affects young and 
consolidated democracies differently, and municipalities have less “fiscal levers” to “play 
with” than national governments. But with these caveats in mind, this paper does suggest that 
lower costs of political entry in a multi-party democracy are beneficial. 
 
References 
Angrist, J. and V. Lavy, “Using Maimonides’ Rule to Estimate the Effect of Class 
Size on Scholastic Achievement,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, pp. 533–576, 
1999. 
Besley, T. and A. Case, “Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting and 
Yardstick Competition,” American Economic Review, Vol. 85, pp. 25-45, 1995. 
Besley, T. and A. Case, “Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy 
Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
110, pp. 769-798, 1995.    23  
 
Besley, T. and A. Case, “Political Competition and Policy Choices: Evidence from 
the United States,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 841, pp. 7-73, 2003. 
Besley, T., T. Persson and D. Sturm, “Political Competition and Economic 
Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States,” NBER Working Paper Series 
11484, 2005. 
Black, S., “Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, pp. 577–599, 1999. 
Campante, F., D. Chor and Q. Do, “Instability and the Incentives for Corruption,” 
SSRN Working Paper, 2008. 
Degan, A. and A. Merlo, “A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple 
Elections,” PIER Working Paper 07-011, 2007.  
Duverger, Maurice Political Parties, New York: Wiley, 1954. 
Fan, J., Gijbels, I., Local Polynomial Modeling and its Applications, Chapman & 
Hall, London, 1996. 
Ferraz, C. and F. Finan, “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s 
Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
123, pp. 703-745, 2008. 
Fujiwara, T. “Does Plurality Rule Favors the Two Party System? A Regression 
Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger’s Law”, Unplished manuscript, 2009. 
Gordon, S. and F. Huber, “The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent 
Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol.2, pp. 107-138, 2007.    24  
 
Hahn, J., P. Todd and W. Van der Klaauw, “Identification and Estimation of 
Treatment Effects with Regression Discontinuity Design,” Econometrica, Vol. 69, pp. 201-
209, 2001. 
Imbens, G. and T. Lemieux, “Regression Discontinuity Designs: a Guide to Practice,” 
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 142, pp. 615-635, 2008.  
Jones, M. Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies, Notre Dame: 
University of Notre, 1995. 
Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. “The "Effective" Number of Parties: a Measure with 
Application to Western Europe,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol 12, pp. 3-28, 1979. 
Lee, D., “Randomized Experiments from non-Random Selection in U.S. House 
Elections,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 142, pp. 675-697, 2008. 
Lee, D., E. Moretti and M. Butler, “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence 
from the US House,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103, pp. 807-859, 2004. 
Lemieux, T. and M. Milligan, “Incentive Effects of Social Assistance: a Regression 
Discontinuity Approach,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 142, pp. 807-828, 2008. 
McClintock, C., “Plurality versus Runoff Rules for the Election of the President in 
Latin America: Implications for Democracy,” Annals of the Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, 2007. 
McCrary, J. “Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity 
Design: a Density Test,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 142, pp. 698-714, 2008. 
Merlo, A., “Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues,” in Advances in 
Economics and Econometrics, Theory and Applications: Ninth World Congress of the    25  
 
Econometric Society, eds. Blundell, R., W. Newey and T. Persson, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
Milesi-Ferretti, R. Perotti and M. Rostagno, “Electoral Systems and Public 
Expenditures,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, pp. 609-657, 2002. 
Palfrey, T. “A Mathematical Proof of Duverger’s Law,” in Models of Strategic 
Choice in Politics, ed. Ordeshook, P., Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1989. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, “Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 94, p. 25-45, 2000.  
Rodgers, D. and J. Rodgers, “Political Competition and State Government Size: Do 
Tighter Produce Looser Budgets?” Public Choice, Vol. 105, pp. 1-20, 2000. 
Thistlewaite, D. and D. Campbell, “Regression-Discontinuity Analysis: An 
Alternative to the Ex Post Facto Experiment,” Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 51, 
pp. 309–317, 1960. 
Van Der Klaauw, W., “Estimating the effect of financial aid offers on college 
enrollment: a regression-discontinuity approach,” International Economic Review, Vol. 43, 
pp. 1249–1287, 2002. 
Werneck, R. “The Rocky Road to Countercyclical Fiscal Policy in Brazil”, 
Manuscript, PUC-Rio, Brazil, Department of Economics.    26  
 
 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Municipal Election Races 
 Table 1.A: Demographics 
 Mean  Std  Dev  Median  Num.  Obs. 
  Panel A: All Races 
Size of Electorate  19,498  126,585  7,066  16,498 
Income per Capita
a 169.23  97.37  157.63  16,674 
Gini Coefficient  0.55  0.08  0.56  16,674 
Average Years of Schooling
b 4.00  1.34  4.05  16,674 
  Panel B: Races With 100,000-300,000 Voters 
Size of Electorate  159,105  48,991  143,661  282 
Income per Capita
a 333.82  46.13  318.67  282 
Gini Coefficient  0.56  0.01  0.56  282 
Average Years of Schooling
b 6.49  0.39  6.36  282 
Table 1.B: Political Competition Variables 
 Mean  Std  Dev  Median  Num.  Obs. 
  Panel A: All Races 
Number of Candidates  2.78  1.12  2.00  16,498 
Effective Number of Candidates
c 2.20  0.55  1.99  16,498 
Share of Votes of Third Placed and Lower
d 7.26  11.42  0.00  16,498 
  Panel B: Races With 100,000-300,000 Voters 
Number of Candidates  4.72  1.51  5.00  282 
Effective Number of Candidates
c 2.67  0.62  2.65  282 
Share of Votes of Third Placed and Lower
d 19.44  12.24  18.49  282 
 
Table 1.C: Fiscal Policy Outcomes (Second Stage Variables) 
 Mean  Std  Dev  Median  Num.  Obs. 
  Panel A: All Sample 
Investment as % of Total Expenditures
  14.68 6.65  13.44  7428 
Current Expenditures as % of Total Expenditures  77.94  7.21    73.25  7413 
Payroll Expenditures as % of Total Expenditures  58.59  8.29  58.66  7413 
% Change in Number of Schools  3.51  95.69  0.00  10,798 
  Panel B: Races With 100,000-300,000 Voters 
Investment as % of Total Expenditures
  15.23 7.48  14.14  224 
Current Expenditures as % of Total Expenditures  71.99  14.48    73.25  221 
Payroll Expenditures as % of Total Expenditures
c 49.44  15.53  46.43  221 
% Change in Number of Schools  9.69  25.70  5.83  196 
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística. 
aIn 2000 reais. 
b Years of schooling for the population between 15 and 64 years old. 
c The number of 
effective candidates is the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) multiplied by 10,000. 
d Percentage 
of votes received by candidates placed third or lower in the first round. 
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Table 2. Effect of Electorate Size on Electoral Competition  
   Panel A: Dependent Variable: Log(100-Vote Share of Top Two Candidates) 
  All  Reelection  All  Reelection 
   (1)  (2)
 (a)  (3)
   (4)
(a) 
Dummy For 200,000 or 
More Voters 
0.601   1.141  0.594  1.129 
(0.277)**  (0.363)***  (0.279)**  (0.363)*** 
Quadratic Polynomial of 
Electorate Size?†  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Linear Polynomial interacted 
with Dummy?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.079  0.090   0.096  0.112 
Number of Observations  292  147  292  147 
   Panel B: Dependent Variable: Log(Number of Effective Candidates) 
Dummy For 200,000 or 
More Voters 
0.133   0.222  0.132   0.222 
(0.049)***  (0.079)***  (0.047)***  (0.077)*** 
Quadratic Polynomial of 
Electorate Size?     Yes  Yes  No  No 
Linear Polynomial 
interacted with Dummy?    No  No  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.086  0.068   0.099  0.103 
Number of Observations  292  147  292  147 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions 
include year dummies. 
†: Polynomial is (Electorate size- 200,000) and (Electorate size- 200,000)
2 
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Table 3. Reduced Form Estimates for the Effect of Political Competition on Policy Outcomes 
  All   Reelection  All   Reelection 
   (1)  (2)
(a)  (3)
   (4)
(a) 
   Panel A: Dependent Variable: Log(Investment as % of Expenditures) 
Dummy For 200,000 or More Voters 
0.282  0.588  0.297  0.595 
(0.142)*  (0.214)**  (0.140)**  (0.204)*** 
Quadratic Polynomial of Electorate Size?  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Linear Polynomial interacted with Dummy?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.133  0.179  0.138  0.185 
Number of Observations  233  116  233  116 
   Panel B: Dependent Variable: % Change in the Number of Schools 
Dummy For 200,000 or More Voters 
12.858  19.301  13.704    20.293 
(5.780)**  (7.895)**  (5.419)**  (7.290)*** 
Quadratic Polynomial of Electorate Size?  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Linear Polynomial interacted with Dummy?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.121  0.096  0.121  0.094 
Number of Observations  199  143  199  143 
  Panel C: Dependent Variable:  Log(Current Expenditures as % of Expenditures) 
Dummy For 200,000 or More Voters 
-0.032  -0.051  -0.037   -0.062 
(0.042)  (0.033)  (0.053)*  (0.029)** 
Quadratic Polynomial of Electorate Size?  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Linear Polynomial interacted with Dummy?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.275  0.195  0.275  0.205 
Number of Observations  230  114  230  114 
  Panel D: Dependent Variable:  Log(Payroll as % of Expenditures) 
Dummy For 200,000 or More Voters 
-0.024  -0.132   -0.030   -0.138 
(0.067)  (0.065)*  (0.063)  (0.054)** 
Quadratic Polynomial of Electorate Size?  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Linear Polynomial interacted with Dummy?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.551  0.030  0.551  0.642 
Number of Observations  230  114  230  114 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include year dummies. 
†: Polynomial is (Electorate size- 200,000) and (Electorate size- 200,000)
2 
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 Table 4. Causal Effect of Political Competition on Policy Outcomes: only reelection races 
   (1)  (2)  (3)
   (4) 
Regressor: 
Log(100-Vote Share of Top Two 
Candidates)  Log (Number of Effective Candidates) 
  Panel A: Dependent Variable: Log(Investment as % of Expenditures) 
Causal Effect (Elasticity)  0.557*  0.609*  3.484  3.795 
Quadratic Polynomial of Electorate Size?  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Linear Polynomial interacted with Dummy?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of Observations  116  116  116  116 
   Panel B: Dependent Variable: % Change in the Number of Schools 
Causal Effect (Elasticity)  18.433  19.492*  106.036*  106.361** 
Quadratic Polynomial of Electorate Size?  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Linear Polynomial interacted with Dummy?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of Observations  143  143  143  143 
  Panel C: Dependent Variable:  Log(Current Expenditures as % of Expenditures) 
Causal Effect (Elasticity)  -0.048  -0.063  -0.297  -0.387 
Quadratic Polynomial of Electorate Size?  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Linear  Polynomial interacted with Dummy?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of Observations  114  114  114  114 
  Panel D: Dependent Variable:  Log(Payroll as % of Expenditures) 
Causal Effect (Elasticity)  -0.125  -0.140*  -0.771  -0.855 
Quadratic Polynomial of Electorate Size?  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Linear  Polynomial interacted with Dummy?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of Observations  114  114  114  114 
*** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level    30  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Electorate Size 
Histogram and Estimated Density of Electorate in 100,000-300,000 Voter Range 
 
Note: Kernel Density Estimated with Epanechnikov Kernel 
 
Figure 2. Discontinuities in the Estimated Density of Electorate 
2.A Discontinuity at 200,000 Voters 
 
Notes: Using McCrary’s Local Linear Procedure with Triangular Kernel (width of 30,000 and bin of 14,000). 
 
2.B. Discontinuity at 150,000 Voters. 
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 Figure 3. Income and Demographic Sample Statistics for Races Around the Discontinuity at 




Notes: Plots show the estimated linear regression for each side of the discontinuity. Shadowed area corresponds 
to the 90 percent level confidence interval. Scattered points indicate averages for each 10 thousand electorate 
range interval. Due to the low frequency with which income, inequality and schooling data is available, we 
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Figure 4. Reduced Form Estimates for Political Competition:  
Residuals from a Regression on Year Dummies; Discontinuity at 200,000 Registered Voters 
  
  
    
  
Notes: Variables initially regressed on year dummies. Plots show the estimated linear regression of residuals for 
each side of the discontinuity. Scattered points indicate averages for each 10 thousand electorate range interval. 
Shadowed area corresponds to the 90 percent level confidence interval. Statistical significance is implied when 
the estimated line in one range lies outside of the confidence interval for the other range (as is the case in all 
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Figure 5. Reduced Form Estimates for Fiscal Policy Outcomes:  
Residuals from a Regression on Year Dummies; Discontinuity at 200,000 Registered Voters 
  
  
    
  
Notes: Variables initially regressed on year dummies. Plots show the estimated linear regression of residuals for 
each side of the discontinuity. Scattered points indicate averages for each 10 thousand electorate range interval. 
Shadowed area corresponds to the 90 percent level confidence interval. Statistical significance is implied when 
the estimated line in one range lies outside of the confidence interval for the other range. That is the case in all 
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